Topics for Bachelor’s and Master’s Theses

Topics are always marked as BA (Bachelor’s thesis) or MA (Master’s thesis). Very often, the listed topics can be both used for a Bachelor’s thesis as well a Master’s thesis. The preferred choice (BA or MA) is always listed first, however.

The student can also ask for a modification of the topic in accordance with his/her interests, or propose his/her own topic. These topics should be related to the following fields of research:

  • Philosophy of language,
  • History of 20th century philosophy,
  • Free will

 

Libertarian Compatibilism about Free Will (MA, BA)

The standard argument against the compatibility of free will and determinism is the so-called Consequence Argument. This argument has been criticized, defended and reformulated since its modern formulation by Peter van Inwagen (1975). In recent years, a new compatibilist response has been developed against van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument, arguing that it conflates two levels of description: physical and psychological determinism. This has led to the development of a new position called ‘libertarian compatibilism’ (List 2014, 2019) which centres around the claim that physical determinism is compatible with psychological indeterminism, and takes this as the starting point to argue that an agent can have the ability to do otherwise in a (physically) deterministic universe. The aim of this thesis is to clearly summarize van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument, the libertarian compatibilist response to it, and to critically evaluate this response. Furthermore, the thesis critically investigates the differences and similarities between the compatibilist libertarian response and some other traditional responses in the literature (e.g. the counterfactual response in Rummens 2021).

  • List, Christian. “XII—What’s wrong with the consequence argument: A compatibilist libertarian response.” In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 119, no. 3, pp. 253-274. Oxford University Press, 2019.
  • List, Christian. “Free will, determinism, and the possibility of doing otherwise.” Noûs 48, no. 1 (2014): 156-178.
  • Rummens, Stefan. “The counterfactual structure of the consequence argument.” Erkenntnis 86, no. 3 (2021): 523-542.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “How to think about the problem of free will.” The Journal of ethics 12, no. 3 (2008): 327-341.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. “The incompatibility of free will and determinism.” Philosophical studies 27, no. 3 (1975): 185-199.

 

Brandom’s Inferentialism and Some of Its Challenges (MA, BA)

Rooted in the work of Wilfrid Sellars (1953), for more than three decades, Robert Brandom (1994, 2000) has developed and defended the position of ‘semantic inferentialism’ within the philosophy of language, arguing that propositional content can be represented in terms of relations of consequence and incompatibility. To this, Brandom adds a so-called ‘normative pragmatics’, which explains the conferral of propositional content in terms of our social practices of attributing and undertaking commitments, as well as attributing entitlements. Given that some aspects of Brandom’s theory have been criticized throughout the years, the aim of the thesis is to critically engage with some of these traditional criticisms. The thesis first gives an overview of Brandom’s semantic inferentialism, then discusses a number of objections to some aspects of his theory, and finally critically engages with these objections.

  • Andrade-Lotero, Edgar, and Catarina Dutilh Novaes. “A contentious trinity: Levels of entailment in Brandom’s pragmatist inferentialism.” Philosophia 40 (2012): 41-53.
  • Brandom, Robert. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press, 1994.
  • Brandom, Robert. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press, 2000.
  • Brandom, Robert. “Inferentialism and some of its challenges.” In Reading Brandom, pp. 169-190. Routledge, 2010.
  • Fodor, Jerry, and Ernie Lepore. “Brandom beleaguered.” In Reading Brandom, pp. 191-204. Routledge, 2010.
  • Fodor, Jerry, and Ernie Lepore. “Brandom’s burdens: Compositionality and inferentialism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63, no. 2 (2001): 465-481.
  • Murzi, Julien, and Florian Steinberger. “Inferentialism.” A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (2017): 197-224.
  • Sellars, Wilfrid. “Inference and meaning.” Mind 62, no. 247 (1953): 313-338.

 

Modal Normativism Revisited (MA, BA)

Modal normativism is the position that the main function of making alethic modal claims is to convey norms of reasoning. While different versions of this position were defended throughout 20th century philosophy, the view had been abandoned for a couple of decades. In her recent book Norms and Necessity (2020), Amie Thomasson aims at reviving this expressivist, non-descriptivist position about modality by responding to traditional objections and by more carefully analyse the relationship between alethic modality and deontic normativity. Since the publication of the book, a number of people have responded to various aspects of Thomasson’s position. The thesis will critically engage with both Thomasson’s views as well as these responses.

  • Chrisman, Matthew, and Kevin Scharp. “Norms and Necessity, by Amie Thomasson.” (2024): 267-276.
  • Donaldson, Tom, and Jennifer Wang. “Modal normativism and De Re modality.” (2022).
  • Eklund, Matti. “Thomasson on Modal Language.” In Thomasson on Ontology, pp. 137-161. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023.
  • Miller, Kristie. “Counterpart theory: metaphysical modal normativism by another name.” Inquiry 67, no. 8 (2024): 2339-2360.
  • Sud, Rohan. “Modal normativism on semantic rules.” Inquiry 67, no. 8 (2024): 2361-2380.
  • Thomasson, Amie L. Norms and necessity. Oxford University Press, 2020.

 

The History of Modal Normativism (BA, MA)

Modal normativism is the position that the main function of making alethic modal claims is to convey norms of reasoning. While different versions of this position were defended throughout 20th century philosophy, the view had been abandoned for a couple of decades. In her recent book Norms and Necessity (2020), Amie Thomasson not only aims at reviving this position, but also gives an overview of predecessors of the non-descriptivist, expressivist account of modality she develops. Some of the philosophers she discusses include Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Ryle, Sellars, Blackburn and Brandom. While there are indeed similarities between these different positions, there are also many differences. The aim of the thesis is to either focus on one specific philosopher’s account of modality (BA), or to work towards a a taxonomy of different types non-descriptivist/expressivist/normativist views of modality (MA).

  • Blackburn, Simon. Essays in Quasi- Realism. Oxford University Press, 1993.
  • Brandom, Robert. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Oxford University Press, 2008.
  • Carnap, Rudolf. Logical Syntax of Language. Routledge, 1934.
  • Ryle, Gilbert. The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson, 1949.
  • Ryle, Gilbert. “‘If,’ ‘So,’ and ‘Because.’” In Collected Papers, Volume 2, 234– 49. Hutchison, 1950/ 1971.
  • Sellars, Wilfrid. “Inference and meaning.” Mind 62, no. 247 (1953): 313-338.
  • Thomasson, Amie L. Norms and necessity. Oxford University Press, 2020.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus. Translated by C. K. Ogden. Routledge, 1922/ 1933.

 

 

 

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